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“Let me recite what history teaches,” wrote the 20th century American novelist 
Gertrude Stein. “History teaches.” 
Does history teach? In particular, does history teach about job destruction and 
creation? Can the study of history, both in case studies and in the broad strokes 
of trends, help us understand how structural changes in the U.S. economy have 
affected growth and inequality in the past? Can they give clues about what we 
can expect in the future?
The Washington Center for Equitable Growth set out to answer those questions 
by establishing a Working Group on the History of Technology. In a Washington, 
D.C. policy environment dominated by economists and political scientists, 
we wanted to see if the tools and concepts of the history of technology can be 
deployed in ways that complement those other disciplines. After all, historical 
precedents are routinely cited in policy discussions, but rarely are they subjected 
to the close analysis that professional historians can bring to the conversation.
Our working group of technology historians seeks to answer the question of 
whether there are elements of previous mass technological shifts that may aid 
in the management of workforce disruptions brought about by the post-high-
tech revolution. The group considered this question in light of the overarching 
mission of Equitable Growth to investigate whether and how economic inequal-
ity affects economic growth and stability. By casting an informed look back to 
previous technology-driven job upheavals, we may find shifts in inequality and 
growth—shifts that indicate whether these phenomena are linked. If so, then 
perhaps answers to today’s growing income and wealth gaps will lie in some 
combination of spontaneous forces and active interventions by government or 
through public-private alliances. 
We did not look for technological speculation or “futurism” in our work. But any 
technology that is or has been in operation for the last couple of hundred years 
Explaining the “History of Technology” 
series and equitable growth
By Jonathan D. Moreno
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has been fair game for our group, from the steam engine and railroad to nanoen-
gineering, synthetic biology and microchip production, as well as the workforces 
related to those endeavors. Otherwise, in charging our group of historians, we 
brought no preconceptions in this regard. Nor do we think that there will neces-
sarily be a clear line from previous experience to the future. Some past events 
and concepts might be a dead end, but some might provide a foothold, however 
modest, on understanding what lies ahead.  
Whatever the case, historical lessons are too important to be ignored in consider-
ing the future of job creation in a post-high-tech world. In the words of the 18th 
century Scottish philosopher David Hume—a decidedly less musical but no less 
nuanced writer than Gertrude Stein—the future tends to resemble the past. The 
challenge, we might add, is ascertaining which tendencies will turn out to matter 
in the years ahead.
Jonathan D. Moreno is the David and Lyn Silfen University Professor at the University 
of Pennsylvania, where he teaches and researches medical ethics and health policy, 
the history and sociology of science, and philosophy. Moreno has served as an advi-
sor to many U.S. governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. Moreno is an elected member of the National Academy 
of Medicine ( formerly the Institute of Medicine) of the National Academies and is the 
U.S. member of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee.
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Overview
Members of the military 
police keep back protest-
ers during a 1967 sit-in at 
the Mall Entrance to the 
Pentagon.
BY U.S. ARMY, VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
Consider the themes that predominate in American political discourse today. 
Political polarization. A seemingly endless land war in Asia. Anxieties about/cel-
ebration of changing sexual mores. Debate about race, gender, and class inequities. 
Disruptions of older industries and the rise of new ones thanks to offshoring and 
automation. Worries about the geopolitical, economic, and environmental impli-
cations of dependence on fossil fuels. A Cold War with Russia. Hot wars among 
the nations of the Middle East. Plus ça change! 
Literally none of these are new. Indeed, in the years around 1970, every one of these 
themes was in the headlines on a daily basis, often treated in the same way as today. 
Much has changed since then, of course—back then, we had a military draft and 
daily casualty lists, the post-industrial society was still only a prediction, major cities 
were on their way down not up, the Baby Boom generation’s demographic bulge was 
centered on youth cohorts not retirees, and the terrorists appearing in the headlines 
were more often Marxists than Islamists. And even where we can discern similarities 
between today and the early ‘70s, we need to be skeptical of presentism or reductive 
lessons from the past. History may rhyme, but it doesn’t repeat.
Still, parallels with the past can remind us that what we think is new is not, and 
that what we think will work now has failed before. Histories of the past—much 
like scenario planning for the future—can help us identify the constellations of 
actors and interests that are party to different issues, and how those actors and 
interests might interact and evolve. And sometimes the past is genealogically, 
not analogically, related to the pressing issues of today and can therefore help us 
diagnose our situation.
This report will argue that science and technology policy is one of the areas where 
looking to the years around 1970 is especially useful in thinking about strategies to 
promote innovation-led equitable economic growth today. The late 1960s and early 
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1970s were a period of incredible stress for the nation’s research-and-development 
enterprise. Research budgets that had been climbing steadily since the early ‘50s—
and which some leading scientists expected to continue rising forever—suddenly 
flat-lined for what turned out to be 15 years, from 1968 to 1983. Employment in 
some technical fields, especially in the engineering and the physical sciences, cra-
tered, leaving applicants with worse prospects than during the Great Depression.1 
Student activists, politicians, community organizers, and many scientists themselves 
agitated—occasionally violently—for reforms to U.S. R&D processes.2 Who should 
fund it? What topics should receive attention? Who should do the research? How 
should researchers interact with a greater variety of stakeholders?
In and around 1970, the pipeline of undergraduate and graduate students in the 
sciences thinned dramatically—especially in comparison to the post-Sputnik 
space-race bulge—thanks to the poor job market coming out and antipathy 
toward military-industrial sponsorship of research going in. Looking around at 
their declining budgets and enrollments, the bombing and burning of campus lab-
oratories, and growing national interest in parapsychology and New Age religion, 
many scientists and engineers believed America was in the grip of an anti-science 
and anti-technology fever, though if they’d looked more carefully, they might have 
seen that many activists just wanted a different kind of science and technology 
than the kind forged in the early Cold War.
And a different kind of science they got, in part. Researchers in the United States 
did become less dependent on the national security state, though not to the extent 
demanded by campus radicals such as the Students for a Democratic Society. 
Representation of women and some ethnic minorities increased in many fields—
dramatically in some; hardly at all in others—though not to the extent imagin-
able at the time. Policies encouraging or requiring researchers to connect to the 
market, to civil society at large, and to local communities in particular became 
standard at many granting agencies. The cavalier attitude of many researchers 
toward the environmental and occupational hazards of laboratory research waned. 
In science as much as in advertising, we no longer live in the world of Mad Men.
Moreover, despite (or in some cases because of) these stresses on the research 
enterprise of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, that period saw some remarkable achieve-
ments by U.S. scientists and engineers across a variety of fields: the first success-
ful predictions from the Standard Model in high-energy physics; the Apollo and 
Viking landings and Pioneer and Voyager flybys in space exploration; the inven-
tion of recombinant DNA techniques in molecular biology; the “microproces-
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sor revolution” in electrical engineering; the discovery of hydrothermal vents in 
oceanography; the prediction of depletion of the ozone layer in climate science.
The 1970s also were the period when the field of science and technology studies 
emerged. The timing is no coincidence. Many of the early practitioners of this new 
field of study were reformist scientists. Some (including quite a few scientists) had 
come of age in the feminist movement (and to a lesser extent the gay rights, civil 
rights, and various Marxist, pacifist, and anticolonial movements) and approached 
science and technology studies as a place to apply epistemologies and social con-
sciousness developed in those arenas. Others were more cautious reformers—some 
were antagonistic toward social theory, counterculture, and student activism—but 
helped organize programs in this new field of study out of commitment to the 
expansive vision of interdisciplinary collaboration that flourished in U.S. academic 
and science policy circles in this period. And yet another branch of early science and 
technology studies included social scientists eager to apply their field’s tools to sci-
ence in an era when students, funding, and prestige were momentarily flowing from 
the natural sciences to the social sciences rather than the other way around.
In other words, the origins and early outlook of science and technology studies 
should be interpreted in the context of the upheavals sweeping the United States 
(and more generally the Anglophone and Western European) research enter-
prise around 1970. Science and technology studies should, in particular, be seen 
as inheriting pieces of several of the reform movements that arose in that era, 
which sought to improve the research enterprise by questioning its practitioners’ 
assumptions and broadening their perspectives. 
One of the main preoccupations of science and technology studies then and today is 
the concept of “responsible innovation.”3 The promotion of innovation that aims for 
responsiveness to society and responsibility toward the environment is an important 
area of activity in this field. Yet the phrase “responsible innovation” has never been 
used with more frequency than in the early 1970s. So what was going on in those 
years? In part, this was simply a moment when Americans were being asked to rec-
ognize their “responsibility” for a lot of things: racism, sexism, colonialism, poverty, 
environmental degradation, the potential for nuclear annihilation, and the actuality 
of conflicts in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. But that can’t be all. “Responsibility” 
and “innovation” were paired so often in this period because of the multiple cri-
ses—both real and perceived—facing American science and society at the time. 
“Innovation,” as long as it was done responsibly, could offer solutions to a long list of 
problems that Americans believed they were besieged by. 
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Conversely, civic “responsibility” could offer legitimacy to a similarly besieged 
research-and-development enterprise. Examples of “irresponsible” innovation and 
research were continually in the public eye in this period. Activists on the left prob-
ably had a more expansive idea of what was irresponsible, but one of the hallmarks of 
this period is the speed with which research that the mainstream formerly deemed 
unproblematic—such as the racist Tuskegee Syphilis Study—suddenly became 
condemnable by all. Making innovation responsible—showing Americans that sci-
entists and engineers were hard at work solving civil society’s ills—became a favored 
means to escape condemnation and regain science’s early postwar authority.
But what counted as “responsible innovation?” And how did it play into more 
stable and sustainable economic growth? If we want to foster it today, then it 
seems to me that we need to understand how the referent of that term today is 
and is not different from what it meant in its former heyday. And, to the extent 
that it means the same thing today, then we need to examine what happened to 
the proto-responsible innovation movement of yesteryear—what worked, what 
didn’t, what was retained or washed away as the circa-1970 boom in this field 
faded from memory to the point that we have trouble remembering it today.
The rest of this report, therefore, is composed of a series of vignettes from this 
period that attempt to convey the multiple, overlapping meanings of responsible 
innovation in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s. I’ve presented some of these vignettes in 
longer form elsewhere.4 I will eventually present all of them in a book tentatively 
entitled “Through Change and Through Storm: U.S. Physical and Engineering 
Scientists in the Long 1970s.” The vignettes are not a randomly selected represen-
tative sample of American science around 1970. Rather, each case study exempli-
fies certain trends such that a U.S. scientist or engineer from that era could read 
the vignette and say “yes, that is the kind of thing that is happening in lots of places 
these days,” whether or not they agreed that “that” ought to be happening.  
Some of the themes that emerge from the cases have receded or disappeared 
today; others are still going strong, but their origins have been forgotten. 
Collectively, the cases show that different aspects of reform were entangled, in 
ways that complicate reforms to innovation governance, then and now. Still, I’ll 
draw some concluding lessons from the cases for how responsible innovation 
today might be done with an eye to the past and to its implications for more sus-
tainable and equitable economic growth.
12 Washington Center for Equitable Growth | Responsible Innovation: The 1970s, today, and the implications for equitable growth
Much has been written about how Stanford University became one of the out-
standing winners of the early Cold War up to 1970, as well as how it became 
the paradigmatic entrepreneurial university from the early ‘80s to the present. 
Yet we know very little about how Stanford navigated the ‘70s, and how it trans-
formed from a Cold War university into an entrepreneurial university. Like many 
Vietnam-era campuses, Stanford was riven by (sometimes violent) protests. 
Unlike most of their peers, though, Stanford’s protesters were particularly focused 
on research reform as a means to undermine the military-industrial complex, 
increase democratic engagement, and find solutions for poverty, racism, and envi-
ronmental degradation.
Close inspection shows that two buzzwords dominated debates about research at 
Stanford in the early ‘70s: “problem-oriented” and “interdisciplinary.” Usually, these 
terms were paired. That is, the turmoil of the Vietnam era promoted research that 
could be presented as interdisciplinary and as applicable to civilian social problems—
and preferably as both. Researchers who until the late ‘60s had been working almost 
entirely within their own disciplines, almost entirely dependent on national security 
funding, and almost entirely focused on basic research and/or applied research ori-
ented to national security needs, now turned to new funders, new collaborators, and 
new topics. Electrical engineers began working with medical school faculty, computer 
scientists with musicians, aeronautical engineers with philosophers. People from the 
communities surrounding Palo Alto—especially poor and/or majority-minority 
neighborhoods such as East San Jose—began showing up in Stanford labs more 
often, as did blind, hard-of-hearing, and other individuals with sympathetic disabili-
ties who could help Stanford show that it was responding to calls for reform.
With the end of the draft in 1973, though, the appetite for reform receded. What 
University of Oregon management professor Andrew Nelson and I have termed 
An aerial view of Stanford’s 
campus.
BY JRISSMAN, VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A “federation of bull sessions”: Inter-
disciplinarity as a panacea at Stanford
VIGNETTE 1
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“radical interdisciplinarity” proved more difficult to fund and carry out than 
originally envisioned.5 Many Stanford researchers returned to more modest forms 
of interdisciplinary collaboration and to national security funders. Still, things did 
not return to the status quo ante. For instance, Nelson has shown that the number 
of degree-granting interdisciplinary centers at Stanford doubled in 1969 and then 
grew for 20 years at seven times the annual rate of the previous 20 years. Similarly, 
while national security research funding never disappeared entirely (nor should it 
have), after the late ‘60s, Stanford scientists and engineers increasingly turned—
for better and worse—to funding from civilian federal agencies, state and local 
governments, and private firms and foundations. 
Today’s aggressively entrepreneurial and interdisciplinary Stanford would be 
unthinkable without the disruptions of the Vietnam era, even if it bears little 
resemblance to the university imagined by that era’s activists. 
NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center faced the seemingly enviable problem of “exis-
tential success” as it entered the 1970s. Almost from its founding, the center had 
been organized around the mission of putting a man on the moon—so now what? 
One answer was to develop partnerships outside the field of space exploration. 
Success in its existential mission showed other organizations that the Manned 
Spacecraft Center had problem-solving expertise that could help them contend 
with the era’s challenges. Moreover, completion of its existential mission—and 
the lull in operations before its next major undertaking (the space shuttle) entered 
Nothing fails like success: From the 
Moon to Earth at NASA
VIGNETTE 2
President John F. Kennedy delivers 
his proposal to put a man on the 
Moon before a joint session of 
Congress, May 25, 1961.
BY NASA, VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
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service—encouraged the center to seek such collaborations while undermining its 
ability to avoid them.
In 1971, for instance, the Nixon administration arranged a shotgun marriage 
between the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development that resulted in the half-decade oddity of an Urban Studies 
Projects Office appearing on the organization chart of a center devoted to manned 
spaceflight. The Urban Studies Projects Office had nothing to do with space 
colonies; rather, it attempted to bring NASA engineers’ expertise in space cap-
sule “life support” to bear on the problem of supplying life support to humbler 
terrestrial residences such as mobile homes and apartment complexes. In a burst 
of initial enthusiasm, the office offered the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development proposals for the kind of architectural future posited in movies such 
as Sleeper and Logan’s Run—proposals which were unimplementable, if not unin-
telligible, to a federal housing agency mired in the universe of Serpico and Death 
Wish. As the decade wore on, the Manned Spacecraft Center’s contributions 
became tamer and its engineers and administrators less enthusiastic, until finally 
the looming shuttle program offered the grounds for escape.
This odd-couple partnership was hardly unique, either in objectives or trajec-
tory. Within the Manned Spacecraft Center, something like wild-type responsible 
innovation experiments proliferated in this era: from converting the lunar rover 
for use by paraplegics; to adapting techniques for remotely monitoring astronauts’ 
vital signs in space; to the problem of monitoring Native American communities’ 
health on reservations in New Mexico; to working with Meals on Wheels to bring 
modified Skylab dinners to poor, elderly Texas shut-ins. Even the center’s actual 
and planned space operations had a responsible innovation dimension that they 
had not had in the ‘60s and would lose again in the ‘80s—in particular the Earth 
Resources program, which used packages on Skylab and Landsat to monitor pol-
lution, urban land management, and public health threats as well as the proposed 
Solar Power Satellite, a permanent space colony designed to beam photovoltaic 
power directly into the U.S. electrical grid.
The dynamics of existential success made the Manned Spacecraft Center espe-
cially prone to such ventures, but similar engagement with civilian social problems 
swept across the military-industrial research complex in the early ‘70s. Other 
NASA centers, for instance, forayed into smog reduction and alternative energy 
(photovoltaic, photothermal, and wind turbine) development. Most of these 
programs receded in the 1980s, but it is fair to say that NASA, an agency born as a 
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weapon of the Cold War, civilianized permanently if not completely in the 1970s.
Many leading aerospace firms and federal agencies tried to follow suit by branch-
ing into fields such as mass transit and solar power. Even the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the direct descendant of the Manhattan Project and thereby 
producer of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, evolved in the ‘70s into the more 
civilian and diversified Energy Research and Development Administration and 
then into the Department of Energy. Many physicists at these agencies’ National 
Laboratories transitioned from weapons work to alternative energy research 
and biomedicine. Others left the National Labs and formed research clusters in 
universities and think tanks devoted to the same sorts of topics pursued at NASA 
and Stanford, such as, memorably, a group at Brookhaven National Laboratory 
who moved into the State University of New York system and formed a part-
nership with New York City’s Uniformed Sanitationmen’s Association and its 
Commissioner of Sanitation to help the city pick up its trash more efficiently.
Few of these projects prospered and most have been forgotten, in part because the 
philosophy of active state intervention in (certain) social problems waned during 
the Carter and Reagan administrations. But the civilianization of the ‘70s—both 
at federal agencies like NASA and universities like Stanford—was sticky enough 
to linger through the ‘80s, and to set the stage for a more expansive civilianization 
under the post-Cold War Clinton administration. More broadly, these changes 
restructured how Americans thought about research. Early Cold War policy-
makers and institutional entrepreneurs generated a vast stockpile of personnel, 
research infrastructure, and knowledge to help defeat the Soviets. By the late 
‘60s, that system of innovation governance had succeeded to the point of failure. 
Not just in the space race, but all across the scientific and technological front of 
the Cold War, the Soviets now lagged too far to count as foes. Therefore, the U.S. 
research and development enterprise had to be transformed to contend with civil-
ian domestic problems, with economic and technical competition with Western 
Europe and Japan, and with the more complex national security concerns of what 
would soon be the post-Cold War era.
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In 1960, the city of Santa Barbara’s physics community was dominated by defense 
think tanks modeled on the RAND Corporation; by 1990, the think tanks had disap-
peared, replaced by a university physics department in the global first rank, and a thriv-
ing cluster of high-tech startup companies. That transformation was largely due to local 
physicists’ creative responses to the dislocations outlined in the previous vignettes.
The think tanks were the first to move, as the Southeast Asian conflict and the late 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s attempts to rein in defense spending 
brought a halt to the funding glut that had given rise to the think tank industry in 
the first place. Many defense think tanks diversified in the late ‘60s into the same 
civilian-minded topics highlighted above. Some think tanks also spun off startup 
companies that tried to commercialize their researchers’ discoveries for civilian 
markets such as pollution monitoring and health care.
The tendency of military-industrial manufacturing firms to seek civilian markets 
and spawn more civilian-minded startup manufacturing companies in the late 
‘60s has been noted before, especially by historians of the semiconductor indus-
try. And historians have noted the contemporaneous civilianization of research 
topics at defense think tanks as well. In Santa Barbara, though, declines in military 
research funding and in national political culture encouraged defense think tanks 
to spin off startups dedicated to high-tech manufacturing, not just research.
That’s significant because within a couple years, U.S. research universities would 
begin to give rise to high-tech manufacturing startups as well. And what, really, is 
the difference between a defense think tank and a Cold War research university? 
VIGNETTE 3
Turn on, tune in, start up: The 
experimental life in Santa Barbara
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True, universities have students. But plenty of think tanks hosted graduate stu-
dents, and plenty of Cold War university administrators neglected undergraduate 
education as much as they could—so the distinction is a blurry one.
Nowhere was that more true than in Santa Barbara’s physics and computer sci-
ence communities. In those fields, think tank researchers taught courses at the 
University of California-Santa Barbara, while university faculty started, in the 
early ‘70s, to take jobs in think tank spinoffs and eventually to form their own 
high-tech startups. As at Stanford, the entrepreneurial university was a product of 
the dislocations of the Vietnam era. But at both UC-Santa Barbara and Stanford, 
academic entrepreneurship was only one of several avenues of reform in innova-
tion governance. At the time, more energy was put into organizational innovations 
such as new interdisciplinary centers; pedagogical innovations designed to restock 
graduate and undergraduate enrollments (and stem campus activists’ critiques of 
science); and novel modes of community outreach. Then, as now, most faculty 
members quite reasonably tried to weather crisis by doing high-quality research 
as measured by the standards by which they had been trained (science in an early 
Cold War mode), while a few took the upheavals around them as an opportunity 
to try out a more precarious but personally meaningful kind of science.
Thus, in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, members of the UC-Santa Barbara physics 
department formed a new Quantum Institute hosting applied, civilian, interdis-
ciplinary research and a Physics Learning Center hosting local schoolchildren; 
began teaching courses on parapsychology and environmental science; and 
founded garage “companies” selling everything from divining rods to bookcases to 
transistorized acupuncture devices. The department even added a new degree pro-
gram, a master’s of scientific instrumentation, out of fears that its Ph.D. program 
might be canceled. As one might expect given the previous vignettes, the master’s 
program advertised for students who wanted to do applied, interdisciplinary 
research in collaboration with off-campus civic institutions such as community 
hospitals. And that’s what they got—early student projects emphasized the same 
topics we’ve seen at Stanford and NASA: aids for the blind and hard-of-hearing; 
biomedical instrumentation; pollution monitoring equipment—as well as appara-
tus for measuring parapsychological phenomena.
The faculty members most involved with the master’s program were also those 
who had small lifestyle firms in their garages. And so, gradually, organically, and 
without much thought given to profit, student projects were transformed into 
commercial products of high-tech academic “startups,” albeit products sold in very 
low volumes at small markups and to unlikely customers such as parapsychology 
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enthusiasts and schools for the deaf. Over time, the profits increased, the startups 
grew bigger, and the products and customers became more “serious.”  
Once the Reagan-era buildup reversed the funding and enrollment crises of the 
‘70s, the department canceled the master’s program, which had long been seen 
as an embarrassment for the more prestigious (if imperiled) Ph.D. program. 
In response, the faculty head of the master’s program left the university to run 
his startup full-time—a startup that soon became the core of a bustling local 
high-tech cluster, and an engine spitting out serial entrepreneurs and millionaire 
philanthropists.
That’s an endpoint that any American research university would claim to want, 
and UC-Santa Barbara has done its best to benefit from, and take credit for, its 
local high-tech cluster. But how did this university actually get there, and would or 
could any university willingly and willfully go down the path the university took? 
The most salient ingredients that went into this high-tech cluster were: precipi-
tous declines in research funding, enrollments, and public legitimacy; a master’s 
program viewed by core faculty as embarrassing but temporarily necessary; and a 
cadre of alienated departmental faculty, students, and technicians more interested 
in private enthusiasms such as parapsychology, and public desiderata such as 
disability and pollution technologies, than in “serious” physics topics like super-
conductivity and the Standard Model.  UC-Santa Barbara got a high-tech cluster 
despite, not because of, its best efforts—and it only got one because academic 
entrepreneurship was entangled with pedagogical reforms and institutional inno-
vations driven by shifting federal budgetary priorities and the counterculture.
Several recent influential books have emphasized the links among U.S. scien-
tists, engineers, the counterculture, and the New Left in the 1970s.6 As my other 
vignettes should make plain, those links were many, varied, and fascinating. But 
focusing too much on the counterculture may leave us blind to those scientists 
and engineers who were unsympathetic toward the New Left and the youth 
VIGNETTE 4
Burnt by the sun: Jack Kilby and 
the solar boom and bust
Texas Instruments engineer and co-
inventor of the integrated circuit, 
Jack Kilby (early 1960s).
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movement, yet who nevertheless hoped to incrementally adapt the institutions of 
the military-industrial-academic complex to address matters of civil, rather than 
national, security.  Though I haven’t highlighted them much thus far, such middle-
aged, white, male, middle-class, “square scientists” were abundant in each of the 
settings I’ve described. Some were agnostic or even quietly curious about the 
youth movement, but many others ranged from aggressively skeptical to furiously 
hostile—even as they were reforming their research in exactly the ways the New 
Left demanded. There was plenty of common ground between these camps, yet 
no one wanted to be seen to occupy it together.
One very square and very influential scientist was Jack Kilby, co-inventor of 
the integrated circuit, for which he shared a Nobel Prize. A rather famous story 
goes that Kilby invented the integrated circuit in his first month of work at Texas 
Instruments in 1958 while his colleagues were all on vacation. Much less well 
known is that Kilby took a leave of absence from the company in 1970 to work as 
an independent inventor and consultant to it and the Air Force and other stake-
holders in microelectronics. From that perch, Kilby worked furiously to ensure 
that the U.S. military could still steer the domestic semiconductor industry even 
as its share of the market cratered relative to civilian markets for business com-
puters and even consumer goods such as digital watches and the Kilby-designed 
Texas Instruments calculator.
Kilby’s inventions from the early ‘70s were for the most part quite conventional, 
except perhaps for an electronic teaching machine that he shopped to Texas 
Instruments and a number of other firms. Kilby’s interest in teaching machines is 
notable because similar devices were at the center of a cluster of countercultural 
intellectuals and engineers in the San Francisco Bay Area who are often credited 
as inventors of the mouse, the graphical user interface, and even the personal 
computer. Kilby’s teaching machines certainly didn’t lead to the PC, though I 
think it arguable that they did inspire Texas Instruments’ most memorable civilian 
product, the Speak & Spell.
Kilby’s interest in pedagogical innovations extended into undergraduate education 
as well. In particular, he and a former Texas Instruments colleague, Jay Lathrop, 
and Skip Porter, an electrical engineer at Texas A&M University, spent the early 
‘70s developing ways for undergraduates to become familiar with industrial 
integrated circuit manufacturing techniques, which are common sense today but 
were fairly unorthodox thinking at the time. In late 1973, however, Kilby, Lathrop, 
and Porter diverted their attention to solar energy in response to the oil embargo 
by members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. And, for 
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once, the scheme they came up was attractive enough to Texas Instruments that 
it created “Project Illinois” (after Kilby’s alma mater) with the idea of transform-
ing the company from a semiconductor firm into the predominant player in the 
relatively new solar energy industry.
Two things are striking about Kilby’s and Texas Instruments’ rush into solar power. 
First is the extent to which they borrowed from military-industrial resources in 
developing a system to supply electricity and hot water to suburban mansions: from 
elements of the core technology (such as a fuel cell), to the use of scenario planning 
(adapted from nuclear wargaming), to intellectual property terms on government 
contracts, to networks of contacts among personnel continually revolving between 
national security agencies and firms. And second is the extent to which Kilby and 
Texas Instruments disregarded and denigrated the technical abilities of pre-existing 
solar energy advocates, especially those with few links to the military-industrial 
complex. Kilby was as committed to solar power as any hippie, yet he and his col-
leagues evidently believed that only veterans of the military-industrial complex could 
be trusted to develop that technology. Indeed, rather than work with organizations 
such as the Solar Energy Research Institute (headed by Denis Hayes, organizer of the 
first Earth Day), Kilby tried to convince the Air Force to adopt the Illinois system as a 
backup power supply for its MX missile silos!
In many ways, the attitude of Kilby and Texas Instruments was reasonable. 
Military-industrial veterans knew a lot about R&D. The templates they had devel-
oped had already worked in transitioning Kilby’s most important invention, the 
integrated circuit, from military to civilian markets. Yet in forgoing alliances with 
countercultural solar power advocates, Kilby and Texas Instruments left them-
selves vulnerable to the military-industrial complex’s superficial commitment to 
alternative energy. Thus, when the price of oil dropped and the Reagan adminis-
tration pulled federal dollars out of solar R&D, Texas Instruments was left with 
little choice but to abandon Project Illinois, leaving Kilby with little choice but to 
angrily abandon TI. As he put it in a letter to a friend, “this is not a very good time 
to be peddling a solar project. We need another middle east crisis, I guess.”
Kilby wasn’t exactly representative of square American scientists in the ‘70s, but he 
wasn’t such an outlier either. There were many scientists and engineers who, like 
Kilby, weren’t enamored of the counterculture or the reforms suggested by science’s 
liberal establishment but who also didn’t follow the neocon route of Edward Teller 
and Fred Seitz. That indicates to me that our understanding of responsible innova-
tion, whether in the 1970s or today, contains a gaping excluded middle that could, 
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in fact, be populous, active, and productive. The pitfall of the ‘70s, though, was that 
square scientists made themselves into that excluded middle because they themselves 
excluded the possibility of collaboration with the counterculture and the New Left.  
Today’s high-tech excluded middle is configured differently, but it’s still there. 
Consider the gap between teachers and education “reformers,” or between old-
line transportation activists and partisans of the “Uber economy.” In both cases, 
“reformers” claim to bring Silicon Valley-style “disruption” without building com-
mon ground with those being “disrupted,” with the unsurprising result that the 
disruptors’ plans are themselves disrupted.
In 1970, the specters haunting research reform were population growth, environ-
mental degradation, war and nuclear annihilation, bankrupt and riot-torn cities, 
and dependence on fossil fuels. By 1975, the anemic U.S. economy and surging 
competition from Japanese firms were crowding every other motivation for research 
reform out of public discourse. The 1970s saw Japanese firms near or overtake 
U.S. counterparts in multiple industries: steel, shipbuilding, consumer electronics, 
and semiconductor manufacturing. State sponsorship of Japanese semiconductor 
firms, in particular, set off moral panic among U.S. elites. Yet the two major U.S. 
semiconductor firms bought by foreign conglomerates in the ‘70s were both bought 
by European, not Japanese, companies: Philips NV bought Signetics in 1973 and 
Schlumberger purchased Fairchild Industries in 1978. These were important U.S. 
firms. Almost every Silicon Valley semiconductor firm ever is one of the so-called 
VIGNETTE 5
Netherlands, Inc.: Signetics as a 
bellwether of globalization
The Signetics 2513 was a character 
generator chip used in the Apple I 
computer seen here on display at 
the Smithsonian.
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“Fairchildren.” And while Texas Instruments and Fairchild claimed to have invented 
the integrated circuit, the product was considered an immature technology until 
Signetics became the first firm to bet its entire product line on them.
Both Signetics and Fairchild also pioneered the offshoring of semiconductor 
manufacturing to sites with cheap, pliant labor. For Signetics, that meant plants 
in countries ruled by friendly juntas, primarily in East Asia (South Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, but also Portugal), as well as in remote parts of the United 
States, such as New Mexico and Utah, and also Scotland in the United Kingdom. 
The transition to the “post-industrial society” outlined by Harvard University 
sociologist Daniel Bell didn’t start in the semiconductor industry, but by the late 
‘60s Fairchild, Signetics, and their peers were leading the way.7
Indeed, Silicon Valley firms had always been far more successful at fending off 
labor unions at home and abroad than any automaker or coal mine, in part by 
simply shipping jobs away (or threatening to do so) any time unions tried to orga-
nize their plants. So it is either ironic or fitting that Signetics was itself bought by 
Philips, a firm seeking to climb the “league tables” of semiconductor manufactur-
ing through acquisitions of plants in a country (the United States) with a cheaper 
and less organized labor force.
Signetics was relatively immune to the types of socially relevant R&D that swept 
through the sites of my other vignettes. Its managers didn’t perceive any budget-
ary or cultural pressures to branch into biomedical, disability, or environmental 
technologies. And unlike Texas Instruments, it didn’t have the wherewithal (or 
a champion like Kilby) to leap from semiconductor manufacturing into novel 
markets in solar power and pedagogical computing. But Signetics’ refusal to be 
drawn into proto-responsible innovation also meant that it didn’t have to aban-
don anything when socially relevant R&D faded after the mid-‘70s. The sites of 
my other vignettes all emerged from the ‘70s as success stories, but only because 
they ditched many of their most innovative (and “responsible”) initiatives of that 
decade. Signetics didn’t have to do that.
Yet Signetics did change with the times. At the beginning of the ‘70s, it was the 
kind of company where the employee newsletter published the swimsuit photos 
of women employees (“girls”) who entered the annual beauty contest, and where 
the winning “beauties” were white and blond.  At the beginning of the decade, it 
was the kind of company where the president paternalistically called on employ-
ees to “try asking yourself the question, ‘Am I the bottleneck in my area?’” and to 
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“give a damn” by voting—not for the forces of “disorder, riot, and disrespect of 
the democratic order,” but for Richard Nixon! Most tellingly, at the beginning of 
the ‘70s, Signetics was the kind of company where management took great pride 
that its circuits controlled the United States’ nuclear arsenal—even as ordinary 
employees welcomed the “Age of Awareness” of “war, racism, poverty” that the 
youth culture had awakened.
And that “awareness” shone through, gradually. By 1973, for instance, the firm’s 
“girls” had become “women,” and some even attained promotions into middle man-
agement. At the same time, changes in the legislative and economic environment 
forced policy shifts that awareness alone could not—a conservation program in the 
wake of the OPEC embargo, greater insistence on safety practices in the wake of the 
founding of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, programs 
to hire more workers with handicaps in response to equal employment opportunity 
laws, more visible charity drives to reach out to local communities and influence 
local politics. The three articles featured on the cover of a 1984 newsletter encapsu-
late what happened to Signetics in the ‘70s: a profile of a new deaf coworker; a report 
on employees’ contributions to a local blood drive; and news that Signetics and two 
neighboring firms (TRW, Inc. and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.) were being held 
responsible by California’s Regional Water Quality Control Board for a giant under-
ground plume of toxic solvents formed over the previous 20 years by leaks from 
poorly maintained storage tanks.
Signetics offers, therefore, a rather mixed message about the passage of U.S. physi-
cal and engineering scientists through change and through storm. Like its peers, 
Signetics civilianized—military markets vanished in the mid-‘80s, leading to the 
closure of plants and contributing to the firm’s final disappearance into the Philips 
conglomerate in the early ‘90s. Some moves toward responsible innovation took 
hold in the early ‘70s, particularly conservation and more diverse hiring, but by 
the ‘80s the idealism of “awareness” had morphed into expressions of corporate 
“concern” justified by cost-benefit analysis. Unionization was still strongly discour-
aged, in part by the practice of locating plants in friendly dictatorships, but by 
the ’80s most of those U.S.-backed dictatorships were starting to transition to 
democracy. Domestically, unions were kept out through generous benefits and 
cultivation of a “California ideology” of unfettered individual growth and expres-
sion—heavily drenched, though, with the buzzwords and vacuity of the “manage-
ment philosophy” fads of the 1980s. In other words, we have all become Signetics, 
even as Signetics became Philips Semiconductors.
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The five vignettes I’ve presented aren’t entirely independent of each other, though 
I have yet to document any substantial overlap among them either. Rather, actors 
at these five places all independently saw and commented on the same suite of 
changes in American science and society going on around them. The fact that 
those actors responded to and participated in social change in similar ways despite 
the lack of direct personal connections among them tells us a lot about what kinds 
of diffuse factors can drive sweeping (if mostly temporary) research reform.
What I see in looking at these sites is a U.S. research enterprise and system of 
innovation governance that was capable of rapid, dramatic change, but also 
characterized by considerable inertia and complexity. The kinds of research that 
today’s proponents of responsible innovation encourage proliferated in the early 
‘70s: biomedical devices, environmental monitoring and remediation, disability 
technologies, alternative energy, and mass transit. The methods promoted by 
today’s responsible innovation advocates bloomed in the ‘70s, too, especially a 
radical interdisciplinarity in which the natural, social, and engineering sciences 
would find common ground with the humanities. Yet the vogue for wild-type 
responsible innovation was brief, maybe six or seven years. The habits for research 
laid down in the early Cold War never broke entirely, and by the mid-‘70s were 
ascendant once again: national security funding, a more limited notion of interdis-
ciplinarity, and fewer and quieter calls for reform.
It should be clear, then, that the complexity and inertia of the U.S. system of 
innovation governance can hinder the aims of responsible innovation. I want 
to conclude with the argument, however, that complexity and inertia could be 
coopted as tools for responsible innovation, in at least four different ways—and in 
doing so foster an innovation environment that helps power more sustained and 
equitable economic growth.  
First, inertia arises in part from justifiable skepticism about reform. Some of the 
trendy research topics of the early ‘70s, such as parapsychology or zero population 
growth, were entirely worthy of skepticism. Sometimes, of course, self-proclaimed 
skeptics are nothing of the sort—as demonstrated today by well-organized cadres 
of climate change denialists. But under some conditions, skeptics can play an 
important quality control function.
Conclusion
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Second, inertia isn’t the same as stasis. As we saw in several of the vignettes, many 
“square scientists” were open to moving in new directions, and were willing to 
adapt the considerable resources, habits, and knowledge of the military-industrial 
complex to civilian-oriented projects.  In some cases, such as the development 
of consumer markets for integrated circuits, the inertia built up for military-
industrial R&D imparted a substantial impetus to related civilian technologies. 
The trick is to find, create, and appeal to commonalities in the imagined futures of 
squares and reformers, while discouraging the view that either squares or reform-
ers have all of the answers.
Third, the inertia that can hinder reform can sometimes transfer to reform itself. 
Many of the personnel and organizations who experimented with proto-respon-
sible innovation in the early ‘70s retreated from it by the middle of that decade—
only to return to some of the same topics and methods later. The end of the Cold 
War and the massive shift in R&D funding from the physical to the life sciences in 
the 1990s was, in particular, a moment when many of the experiments of the ‘70s 
were resurrected. Even seemingly failed experiments involving responsible innova-
tion can have very long and influential afterlives.
And finally, the inertia of U.S. innovation governance arises in part from its com-
plexity.  American science is steered, funded, and carried out by an astonishing 
variety of kinds of organizations, with only the loosest of centralized direction. 
Democratic desires for reform therefore take a long time to filter through the 
system, and often get washed out before full implementation. But that also means 
that almost any topic can find some niche in the complex ecology of American 
research. Even parapsychologists can get their work funded! And while that can 
lead to some dysfunctions, it also encourages scientists and engineers to make 
their projects as flexible and multivalent as possible so that they can morph to 
appeal to any number of stakeholders. Flexibility is vital because, as we’ve seen, 
different domains of reform in innovation governance are often entangled.  
While the stars rarely align such that experiments prosper in every domain at 
once, the linkages among domains mean reforms in one often contribute to 
reform in many. A new course in responsible innovation, a new product devel-
oped under its auspices, a newly inspired means for researchers to engage with 
the public—all of these are worth trying as each singly is capable of finding some 
constituency and all are likely to advance the prospects of the others. Since dif-
ferent individuals generate their most creative experiments in different domains, 
and we can’t know ahead of time which kinds of experiments in innovation 
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governance will be most enduring or significant, the best strategy is to encourage 
experimentation in many domains and to stimulate cross-linkages between those 
experiments. The strategy that should be avoided is one in which one kind of 
reform—say, encouraging professors to found startup companies—is incentivized 
at the expense of others. In the end, such a narrow strategy is self-defeating.
The main lesson of the 1970s is that a move toward a more responsible innovation 
system in the United States that in turn provides the impetus for more equitable 
economic growth is possible. Indeed, it’s happened before. Then as now, changes in 
innovation governance may be driven by sustained grassroots activism or structural 
reform, but more likely from a combination of the two. Such changes in innovation 
governance will, of course, be met with skepticism and even hostility. In the 1970s, 
polarization between skeptics and activists hindered even those innovation reforms 
that had a broad base of support. The trick is to identify elements of envisioned 
futures that are shared by reformers and skeptics alike, and to allocate resources for 
moving toward those shared elements in a non-zero-sum manner.
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